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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The State's Argument is Grounded in a Misunderstanding of the Current 
Developments in the Constitutional Law Regarding Plea Bargaining 
Mr. Steele raises two issues on appeal: 1) that post-conviction relief should have been 
granted because his plea entered in ignorance of the consequences of the plea violated the state 
and federal constitutional guarantees of due process; and 2) that post-conviction relief should 
have been granted because he was denied the state and federal constitutional rights to effective 
assistance of counsel. Appellant's Opening Brief at p. 7. 
The plea was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent as required by Article 1, § 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution 
because Mr. Steele was not informed of the consequences of an Affordl plea to a sex offense, 
including the impact of the failure to admit factual guilt on the psychosexual evaluation, the 
sentence imposed and the sentence ultimately served. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 
1709 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463 (1970); Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S.Ct. 1473, 1496 (2010) (Scalia, J. and Thomas, J. dissenting, noting that counsel's 
misadvice to defendant entering guilty plea regarding consequences of plea may render the plea 
involuntary under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 
P.2d 626, 628 (1976); Slate v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95,156 P.3d 1193 (2006); State v. Shook, 144 
Idaho 858, 172 P.3d 1133 (Ct. App. 2007). 
And, Mr. Steele was denied the state and federal constitutional rights to effective 
assistance of counsel when counsel failed to inform him of the consequences of entering an 
I North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970). 
A ((ord plea in a sex offense case. Padilla, supra; Booth v. Slate, 151 Idaho 612, 262 P.3d 255 
(2011 ). 
The state has responded to these claims by first arguing that no adverse consequences 
flow from an Alford plea in a sex offense case. The state's theory is that any adverse 
consequences in tenns of the presentence psychosexual evaluation, the sentence imposed, and the 
term of the sentence actually served all flow, not from the Alford plea, but rather from the post-
plea denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility. See Respondent's Brief at pages 4-5,8-
13, 18-20. 
The state's argument is that a defendant may enter an Alford plea, not be advised by the 
court or counsel that maintaining his factual innocence will have consequences, including a 
negative PSI, a negative psychosexual evaluation, a harsher sentence than would be imposed if 
guilt was admitted, and a decreased possibility of parole at the end of the fixed tenn, and that the 
plea will still be valid and the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel will have 
been satisfied because at any moment after entering the plea, the defendant, acting on his own 
volition without assistance from counsel, could decide to change his position and admit factual 
guilt. 
In making this argument, the state is ignoring the significant developments in the 
constitutional law applied in plea bargaining which grew from Brady in 1970, included United 
Slates v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 122 S.Ct. 2450 (2002), continued through Padilla v. Kentucky, 
supra, and was being advanced at the time the state was writing its brief in this case in Lafler v. 
Cooper, U.S. , 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012) and Missouri v. Frye, U.S. , 132 S.Ct. 
- - - -
1399 (2012). This development recognizes that plea bargaining is the nonn in criminal cases, 
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that due process and the right to effective assistance of counsel apply constitutional standards to 
the plea bargaining process, and that to meet constitutional standards, defendants must have 
information, not just about possible minimum and maximum sentences, but the information 
needed to weigh "the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement," compared with other 
possible pleas as well as compared with exercising the right to trial. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1484, 
quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50-51, 116 S.Ct. 356 (1995). Further, these cases 
make clear that the dichotomies of direct and collateral or civil and criminal consequences are no 
longer the limiting principles in determining whether a criminal defendant must be informed of 
the consequences of a guilty plea. Padilla, supra; Lafler; Frye, supra. And lastly, these cases 
make clear that the plea bargaining process is a fluid process and that constitutional protections 
do not extend only to the moment of the entry of the plea or concern only consequences accrued 
at that point. Rather, the constitutional protections apply throughout the criminal proceedings 
and concern consequences which occur even after and outside the criminal proceedings. Id. 
In Brady, the Supreme Court recognized the advantages of plea bargains, both to the state 
and to defendants. However, the Court set parameters: "That a guilty plea is a grave and solemn 
act to be accepted only with care and discernment has long been recognized .... Waivers of 
constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with 
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 397 U.S. at 748,90 
S.Ct. at 1468-69. In applying the constitutional parameter that pleas must be knowing, intelligent 
acts done with sufficient awareness, the Court relied heavily on the fact that Brady acted on the 
advice of competent counsel and that he had the needed information to make an appraisal of the 
prosecution's case against him and the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty 
3 
plea be offered and accepted. While it is not necessary that the defendant "correctly assess every 
relevant factor entering into his decision," it is necessary that he be aware of the relevant factors; 
"Brady was aware of precisely what he was doing when he admitted that he had kidnaped the 
victim and had not released her unharmed." 397 U.S. at 756-8, 90 S.Ct. at 1473-74. " ... like 
many economists, the Court's account [in Brady] assumed that the parties had good information 
and treated uncertainty as a mere matter of rationally forecasting probabilities of conviction." 
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer 
Protection, 99 Cal. L.Rev. 1117, 1126 (2011). But, that assumption has not held. 
In Ruiz, the Supreme Court gave intimations of a coming evolution in the judicial 
constitutional analysis of the law of plea bargaining. When immigration officers found 
marijuana in Angela Ruiz's luggage, the federal government offered her a "fast track" plea 
bargain which required her to waive several constitutional rights including indictment, trial, 
appeal, and any right to receive "impeachment information relating to any informants or other 
witnesses" and information supporting any affirmative defenses in exchange for a government 
agreement to ask for a two-level downward departure under the federal sentencing guidelines. 
Angela balked at waiving any right to disclosure of impeachment and affirmative defense 
information, the government withdrew the plea offer, she pled guilty anyway, and she sought 
relief in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit held that the constitution prohibits defendants from 
waiving their right to information prior to entry of a plea. The Supreme Court disagreed. Us. v. 
Ruiz, supra. 
In reaching its decision, for the first time, the Supreme Court acknowledged that plea 
bargaining is the primary way criminal cases are resolved, noting that 90% or more of federal 
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criminal cases are plea cases. 536 U.S. at 633, 122 S.Ct. at 2456. And, while the Supreme Court 
found that there is not an ul1waivable constitutional right to disclosure of impeachment and 
affirmative defense information prior to entry of a guilty plea, the Court emphasized that to 
waive constitutional rights a defendant must have a full understanding of the nature of the right 
and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances, even though the defendant may 
not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it. 536 U.S. at 629, 122 S.Ct. at 2455. 
Most notably, in Ruiz, the Court stressed that the government was not seeking to get a 
waiver of the bedrock obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence and the Court did not state that 
the government could withhold impeachment evidence without a waiver by the defendant. In 
other words, Ruiz stands for the proposition that one can waive a right one has to infonnation 
prior to pleading, but not for the proposition that a voluntary and knowing plea can be entered 
when the information is withheld and the defendant does not know that the information is being 
withheld. Id 
In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that counsel's failure to advise a noncitizen defendant 
of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea was ineffective assistance of counsel in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment. In so doing, the Supreme Court clarified that it had never 
embraced the dichotomy of direct and collateral consequences to determine the scope of the 
information counsel must share with the defendant prior to entry of a plea: 
We, however, have never applied a distinction between direct and collateral 
consequences to define the scope of constitutionally 'reasonable professional 
assistance' required under Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Whether 
that distinction is appropriate is a question we need not consider in this case 
because of the unique nature of deportation. 
130 S.Ct. at 1481. 
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Instead of determining whether the direct/collateral dichotomy is ever the defining 
principle, the Supreme Court noted that deportation is a particularly severe "penalty," which 
although not strictly a criminal sanction, is intimately related to the criminal process. "We 
conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla's claim." 130 S.Ct. at 1482. 
And, in determining how to apply Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance in plea 
bargaining, the Supreme Court reiterated that "the proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professions norms." 130 S.Ct. at 1482, quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 6688, 104 S.Ct. at 2052. In Padilla, the Supreme Court looked to the 
prevailing norms of practice as reflected in the "American Bar Association standards and the 
like." Id 
Padilla is significant in at least three ways for Mr. Steele's case: First, Padilla squarely 
recognized that to make plea bargaining constitutionally valid, defendants need information to 
evaluate bargained-for results including what happens after the plea is entered, after sentence is 
imposed, and even after the sentence is served. Second, Padilla placed an affirmative duty on 
counsel to inform clients of the known expected consequences of their plea agreements. "[T]here 
is no relevant difference 'between an act of commission and an act of omission' in this context." 
130 S.Ct. at 1485. And, third, Padilla established that the Sixth Amendment analysis of 
effective assistance of counsel does not depend upon whether a consequence is labeled civil or 
collateral, but whether it is severe enough and certain enough to be a significant factor in a 
6 
client's calculus of whether to enter a plea or not. 2 
Padilla was followed this spring by Missouri v. Frye, supra, and Lajler v. Cooper, supra. 
In those cases, the Supreme Comi affirmed that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment 
right to effective counsel during plea negotiations, including when they miss out on, or reject, 
plea bargains because of deficient assistance. 
In deciding Frye and Lajler, the Supreme Court looked at the prevalence of plea 
bargaining and extended the Sixth Amendment protection not only to pleas taken, but also to 
pleas missed. 
The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to the administration of 
the criminal justice system that defense counsel have responsibilities in the plea 
bargain process, responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assistance 
of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at critical 
stages. Because ours 'is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials,' it is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop 
that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. 'To a large extent ... horse 
trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who is going to jail 
and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the 
criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.' 
Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1407, quoting Lafler at 1388 and Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as 
2 Padilla has since been applied in Alaska to find that a post-conviction application 
claiming that a "no contest" plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered and 
was entered in violation of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was 
improperly dismissed where the plea was entered based upon misinformation about the effect it 
would have in a civil case brought by the alleged victim against the defendant. Wilson v. State, 
244 P.3d 535 (Alaska App. 2010). In Georgia, the Court of Appeals applied Padilla to hold that 
the failure to advise a client that his guilty plea will require sex offender registration is 
constitutionally deficient performance. Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384 (Georgia App. 2010). 
Pennsylvania applied Padilla to hold that the failure to advise a client that a guilty plea to 
indecent assault would result in the loss of a teacher's pension was ineffective assistance. 
Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090 (Pa. Super. 2010). And, Tennessee applied Padilla 
to hold that counsel's failure to advise a client that his guilty plea to rape would result in 
mandatory lifetime community supervision was ineffective assistance of counsel. Calvert v. 
Slate, 342 S.W.3d 477 (Tenn. 2011). 
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Contract, 101 YaleL.J.1.909, 1912(1992). 
Of importance to Mr. Steele's case, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment is 
not narrow. Rather, it applies throughout the criminal proceedings. "The constitutional 
guarantee applies to pretrial critical stages that are a part of the whole course of a criminal 
proceeding, a proceeding in which defendants cannot be presumed to make critical decisions 
without counsel's advice." Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. at 1385. This protection also extends 
past the moment of the entry of a plea. " ... 'any amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth 
Amendment signifieance.'" Id., quoting Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198,203,121 S.Ct. 
696, 700 (2001). 
In making its argument that this Court should not consider Mr. Steele's arguments that 
his plea was not valid because it was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered and 
because he was denied the state and federal constitutionally guaranteed rights to effeetive 
assistance of counsel because somehow he was not entitled to be informed that an Alford plea 
carries negative consequences through the psychosexual evaluation, sentencing and thereafter, 
the state has ignored the Supreme Court's holdings discussed above. 
To prevail, the state's argument requires this Court to ignore Padilla which holds that 
eounsel must inform clients of consequences that will occur after sentencing even when they are 
not direct or even criminal law consequences. It also requires this Court to ignore Frye and 
Lafler which hold that Sixth Amendment protections extend not only to the plea taken, but also 
to the process leading up to that plea, and further hold that any additional jail time has Sixth 
Amendment implications. 
Moreover, to prevail, the state's argument requires this Court to find that a criminal 
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defendant may be advised to enter an AljiJrd plea without advisement of the consequences thereof 
and then must be expected, without the advice of counsel, to mitigate those consequences, which 
he does not even know are coming to him, by spontaneously changing his position and admitting 
factual guilt, ideally before the PSI and the psychosexual evaluation are conducted, and most 
certainly before the sentencing hearing and arrival at the prison. But, if not then, at least before 
he appears before the parole board.3 If recent Supreme Court precedent stands for anything, it 
stands for the proposition that these sorts of fictions cannot be used to evade the reach of the 
Sixth Amendment. See Lafler, 132 S.Ct. at 1388 stating: 
In the end, [the government's] three arguments amount to one general contention: 
A fair trial wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea 
bargaining. That position ignores the reality that criminal justice today is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty 
pleas. See Frye, ante, at 1386, 132 S.Ct. 1399. As explained in Frye, the right to 
adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined or enforced without taking 
account of the central role plea bargaining plays in securing convictions and 
determining sentences. Ibid. (' [I]t is insufficient simply to point to the guarantee 
of a fair trial as a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process. '). 
If the guarantee of a fair trial is not a backstop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial 
process, the fantasy that a defendant who has entered an A (ford plea in a sex offense case will 
wake up the morning after the plea hearing and without any advice from counsel suddenly decide 
to avoid all the negative consequences of his failure to admit factual guilt, which by the way no 
one has told him about, by admitting factual guilt, also is not a backstop that inoculates any 
3 The parole board is barred from granting parole to a sexually dangerous person without 
first obtaining a psychological evaluation. I.C. § 20-223(b). 
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errors in the pretrial process. 4 This Court should reject the state's argument that the Fifth 
Amendment right to a knowing, intelligent and voluntary plea and the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel do not apply in this case because Mr. Steele could have 
determined on his own to admit factual guilt and thereby avoid the consequences of his A(ford 
plea. 
B. The Evidence Presented at the Evidentiary Hearing Proved by a Preponderance 
That Mr. Steele's Plea Was Entered in Violation of the Fifth Amendment 
If a defendant's guilty plea is not voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation 
of due process and is void. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466,89 S.Ct. 1166,1171 
(1969). Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13, U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14. 
Relief from an involuntary plea is available in post-conviction if the petitioner proves his 
claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 384, 924 P.2d 1225, 
1228 (Ct. App. 1996); Garzee v. State, 126 Idaho 396, 398, 883 P.3d 1088 (Ct. App. 1994). 
In this case, at the evidentiary hearing, with regard to his claim that his plea was not 
voluntary and knowing, Mr. Steele testified: 
I just filled out the paperwork, like I thought I supposed to, you know, because I 
was saying that I didn't do anything, which I know I didn't. And, you know, I 
thought that I was doing the right thing. You know, if I would have known the 
relative laws that's involved with the Alford plea, with the sexual evaluation and 
even the parole board, you know, they don't recognize all that stuff, I would have 
4 Even prior to Lafler, the state's argument that Mr. Steele's arguments should not be 
considered on appeal because any negative consequences did not flow from the Alford plea but 
rather from his post-plea failure to admit factual guilt was not sound. Mr. Padilla could have 
avoided deportation either by becoming a citizen before he was arrested or by voluntarily leaving 
the country immediately upon pre-trial release whether on bond or his own recognizance. Just as 
this ability to avoid consequences did not oven"ide the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel in Padilla, the supposed ability ofMr. Steele to avoid the consequences of 
his A (ford plea does not override his constitutional rights. 
10 
went to triaL I would not have accepted anything. I would have went to trial all 
the way. 
Tr. p. 62, In. 8-17. 
And, he later testified: 
Ma'am, that's the reason why I accepted the Alford plea is so that I could get out 
on probation and get on with my life, is what I was told. 
Tr. p. 86, In. 21-23. 
And, with regard to parole he testified: 
You know, you give me 25 years fixed anyway. Because the indeterminate time 
didn't matter. Because ifl'm saying - ifl took the Alford plea, I never had no 
idea that the parole board wouldn't let me out. 
Tr. p. 96, In. 19-22. 
When the prosecutor asked the followup question: "Oh, so it's that parole board that you 
didn't know how that worked?" (Tr. p. 97, In. 23-24), Mr. Steele responded: 
Well no, I didn't find out until I got there to the prison, you know. That didn't 
really matter until I got out there. So I didn't know anything about that. 
Tr. p. 96, In. 25 - p. 97, In. 3. 
The only other evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was from the state's witness, 
Larry Smith, Mr. Steele's trial counsel. Mr. Smith testified extensively as to the matters leading 
up to the entry of the Alford plea, as documented in his case diary. However, none of his 
recollections included any advice to Mr. Steele on the consequences of an Alford plea for the 
presentence process including the psychosexual evaluation, the sentence imposed, or ultimately 
the sentence served. Tr. p. 120, In. 14 - p. 163, In. 1. In fact, Mr. Smith testified that he saw no 
"tension" between an A ((ord plea and a SANE evaluation: 
11 
Prosecutor: Fair enough. And then the last subject matter I want to touch on 
before I let you go is the topic of the Alford plea and the SANE evaluation. 
Do you think that, just sort of generically, that there's any tension between an 
Alford plea and then pariicipating in the SANE evaluation? 
Mr. Smith: No. And would you like me to say why? 
Tr. p. 160, In. 23 - p. 161, In. 4. 
Mr. Smith went on to explain that "even if a person couldn't answer questions 
specifically with respect to the incident with which they're charged, they can still provide a good 
deal of material that may be material to the court." Tr. p. 161, In. 23 - p. 162, In. 1. Mr. Smith 
expressed no insight whatsoever that simply because "material may be material to the court" does 
not mean that the material is helpful to the client or that a negative psychosexual evaluation is 
extremely likely when a client does not admit factual guilt. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent 
Prisoner's Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 Iowa 
L.Rev. 491, 519 (2008); Richard A Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, Wis.L.Rev. 237,282 
(2006); Bryan H. Ward, A Plea Best Not Taken: Why Criminal Defendants Should Avoid the 
A!ford Plea, 68 Mo.L.Rev. 913,932 (2003). 
Mr. Steele proved by a preponderance of the evidence that when he made the Alford plea 
he had not been informed of the consequences of the plea - in particular, he had not been 
informed that his failure to admit factual guilt would result in a more negative psychosexual 
evaluation and PSI, a harsher sentence, and ultimately a great likelihood that a longer portion of 
his indeterminate sentence would be served in prison. See PSI and PSE noting Mr. Steele's 
denial of his status as a sex offender in finding that he was not a good candidate for offender 
treatment in either the community or prison and the District Court's statements at sentencing that 
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the most troubling aspect of the case was Mr. Steele's failure to admit factual guilt. PSI p. 15; R 
162-3; Ir. (sentencing) p. 31, In. 11 - p. 32, In. l. 
Mr. Steele has explained why under State v. Heredia 144 Idaho 95, 156 P.3d 1193 
(2006), the consequences of an Alford plea are direct consequences that must be explained to a 
criminal defendant prior to entry of a voluntary and knowing plea. Appellant's Opening Brief at 
pages 10-11. See Heredia, applying a three prong analysis: 1) whether the consequence is within 
the defendant's power to prevent; 2) the punitive or remedial nature of the consequence; and 3) 
the amount of control the sentencing judge has over imposing the consequence. 
Ihe state argues that Mr. Steele had the power to prevent the consequence by admitting 
factual guilt prior to the psychosexual evaluation, PSI preparation, and sentencing hearing. 
Respondent's Brief at page 15-16. However, this argument overlooks the fact that Mr. Steele 
could only employ this strategy if someone informed him of the consequences - and it is the very 
lack of information about the consequences that makes his plea involuntary and not knowing. 
The state next argues that a longer, harsher sentence is remedial and not punitive. 
Respondent's Brief at pages 16-17. However, it is difficult to see how a longer sentence is not 
punitive, especially in this case where the sentencing court was relying on a psychosexual 
evaluation that said that Mr. Steele was not amenable to treatment in any setting, implying that 
his sentence was primarily, ifnot exclusively, intended to be punitive and not remedial. 
And, lastly the state argues that the district court had no control over the consequence of a 
longer sentence being imposed on Mr. Steele, because the "district court plainly had no control 
over whether Steele's psychosexual evaluation rated him a higher risk to reoffend because he 
entered an Alford plea." Respondent's Brief at page 17. This argument completely ignores the 
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fact that it is the court and not the psychosexual evaluator which imposes sentence. 
The state's arguments regarding the Heredia analysis of direct vs. collateral consequences 
are not logically or factually sound and should be rejected. See Brovvn v. Florida, 943 So.2d 899, 
901 (2006), holding "If defense counsel did indeed inform the defendant that he could maintain 
his innocence while on probation, and if, in fact, the failure to admit his guilt during sex offender 
treatment counseling automatically resulted in the unsuccessful completion of such counseling 
and, thus, constituted a probation violation, such a consequence is a direct, and not collateral, 
consequence of the defendant's plea." 
In addition, as set out above and in the Opening Brief, after Padilla, the direct/collateral 
consequences analysis is not controlling of the federal constitutional issue. So, even if this Court 
embraces the state's Heredia analysis, that does not end the inquiry in this case. Rather, this 
Court must go on to consider whether regardless of the Heredia analysis outcome the 
consequences of an Alford plea in a sex offense are such that a defendant cannot enter a valid 
plea unless he has been informed of them. And, given deportation, Padilla, supra, impact on a 
related civil suit, Wilson, supra, sex offender registration requirements, Taylor, supra, loss of a 
pension, Abraham, supra, and community supervision requirements, Calvert, supra, are 
consequences of which the defendant must be aware prior to entry of a plea, a bad psychosexual 
evaluation, longer sentence, and a likelihood of serving more of the indeterminate time are 
consequences requiring notice. 
Indeed, our Court of Appeals noted the importance of notice of potential consequences to 
a defendant in entering an Alford plea in a sex offense case in State v. Jones, 129 Idaho 471, 926 
P.2d 1319 (Ct. App. 1996). In rejecting Jones's claim that the district court denied him his due 
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process rights by accepting his Alford plea and then imposing a condition of probation that 
required he admit guilt in order to complete mandated sexual abuse counseling, the Court of 
Appeals relied heavily on the fact that the district court had specifically notified Jones of the 
hazards ahead of him. The Court of Appeals quoted from two places in the record wherein the 
district court specifically advised Jones that if he continued to maintain factual innocence, he 
likely could not fulfill the probation requirement of completion of sexual abuse counseling and a 
third place where the prosecutor warned that Jones "was going to have to fess up or else he'd 
never make it." 129 Idaho at 474,926 P.2d at 1321. The Court of Appeals held: 
ld. 
Therefore, Jones cannot honestly assert that he had no notice that he would be 
required to admit wrongdoing as a prerequisite to the counseling prescribed in his 
probation. The record also refutes Jones's contention that his understanding was 
that he would not have to admit guilt. Although the trial court's refusal to accept 
Jones's Alford plea would have been appropriate under the circumstances of this 
case and the nature of the program involved, we conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in accepting such a plea .... 
Presumably, had Jones not had notice, he could have successfully challenged the plea as 
not being voluntary, knowing and intelligent. ld. 
The state has chosen to limit its argument on the voluntary nature of the guilty plea to an 
argument that the plea was not involuntary under the Heredia factors. It has not argued that after 
Padilla's disavowal of the direct/collateral consequences dichotomy, the plea in this case was 
valid under a federal constitutional analysis. Respondent's Brief at pages 13-18. Perhaps, this is 
because the state agrees that applying a federal analysis, following Padilla, j it cannot argue that 
5 As noted in Justices Scalia and Thomas's dissents in Padilla, counsel's misadvice to a 
defendant entering a guilty plea regarding the consequences of the plea may render the plea 
involuntary. See also, Danielle M. Lang, Padilla v. Kentucky: The f:!Iect of Plea Colloquy 
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the plea was voluntary or that Mr. Steele is not entitled to post-conviction relief. Or, perhaps the 
failure to argue is simply an oversight. But, whether the state's failure to argue was an 
acknowledgment that it has no legitimate argument or simply an oversight, the fact remains that 
after Padilla the direct/collateral consequences dichotomy is not controlling and under Padilla 
the plea in this case was not voluntary and relief is required. 
C. The Evidence Presented at the Evidentimy Hearing Proved by a Preponderance 
That Mr. Steele Was Deprived of Constitutionally Effective Assistance of 
Counsel 
The state has argued that Mr. Steele has failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of 
counsel because he has failed to show that the "weight of prevailing professional norms" 
supports his contention that trial counsel should have advised him regarding the consequences of 
entry of an Alford plea. Respondent's Brief at pages 24-25, citing Padilla. 
And, the state is correct that Padilla looks to "[p ]revaling norms of practices as reflected 
in American Bar Association standards and the like ... " 130 S.Ct. at 1482. See also, Missouri 
v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. at 1408, stating "Though the standard for counsel's perforn1ance is not 
determined solely by reference to codified standards of professional practice, these standards can 
be important guides." 
The ABA's general standards for the Defense Function state in Standard 4-6.2(b) that 
counsel should "explain to the accused all significant plea proposals." And, Standard 4-5.1(a) 
states that "after informing himself or herself fully on the facts and the law, defense counsel 
should advise the accused with complete candor concerning all aspects of the case, including a 
candid estimate of the probable outcome." 
Warnings on Defendants' Ability to Bring Successful Padilla Claims, 121 Yale L.J. 944 (2012). 
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And, as discussed in the Opening Brief and above, pro[essionallaw journals have been 
discussing the dangers of A?ford pleas in sex offense cases for at least eight years. Yet, Mr. 
Steele's counsel professed no knowledge of any "tension" created by an A?ford plea in a sex 
offense case and went on to explain that there is no "tension" because even if a defendant denies 
factual guilt, a psychosexual evaluation will give the court lots of infonnation that will be 
material in determining what sentence to impose. Counsel did not understand what is part of the 
common knowledge of everyone working in the criminal justice system on sex offense cases -
that a failure to acknowledge factual responsibility is a very significant factor with very clear 
sentencing consequences. (See the prosecutor's argument at Mr. Steele's sentencing hearing 
wherein she stated, " ... but, he's not a good candidate to even be in the prison doing sex 
offender treatment because he is in such denial at this point." R 110, Tr. p. 23, In. 22-25. See 
also, State v. Jones, supra, where both the judge and the prosecutor note that sex offenders who 
do not admit factual guilt, in the prosecutor's words, will "never make it" in treatment.) 
Obviously, the failure to recognize and advise regarding the "tension" in an Alford plea in 
a sex offense case is below prevailing professional norms and is deficient assistance per 
Strickland 
Moreover, it is not defense counsel's role to provide the court with material for 
sentencing if counsel knows or should know or is unsure about whether the material will hann 
his client. See, State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1996) (defense counsel's failure to 
object to district court's use of defense's psychiatric expert in presentence report, despite fact that 
report had not yet been completed, or to object to the prosecution'S calling of the expert as 
witness in aggravation at sentencing hearing constituted ineffective assistance.) 
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The state also makes the argument that Mr. Steele failed to show prejudice, citing 
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847,103 P.3d 460 (2004) and Hayes v. Stale, 143 Idaho 88,93,137 
P.3d 475, 480 (eL App. 2006) apparently arguing that Mr. Steele's state of mind was that he 
wanted to plead guilty. The state discerns this state of mind from its conclusion that trial counsel 
believed that Mr. Steele felt remorse that he was not able to be a role model to his family and 
provide support for them and because Mr. Steele's alcoholism may have affected his memory if 
he had committed an offense. The state argues that, in light of this information, Mr. Steele's 
statements that he would not have entered an Alford plea had he been aware of the consequences 
"ring hollow." Respondent's Brief at pages 26-28. 
This argument, however, just does not make sense. Whether a person feels remorse or 
not has no connection to whether the person would choose to enter an Alford plea. And, whether 
or not Mr. Steele's alcoholism had affected his memory does not have any logical connection to 
the question of whether he would have entered an Alford plea had he known of the consequences 
of failing to admit factual guilt. Hill and Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 620-21, 262 P.3d 255, 
263-4 (2011), hold that "When a defendant alleges some deficiency in counsel's advice regarding 
a guilty plea, the defendant must demonstrate that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" 
But mostly, this argument from the state ignores the essence of Alford pleas and how they 
are different from guilty pleas. 
Alford pleas are awful. There could hardly be a clearer violation of due process 
than sending someone to prison who has neither been found guilty nor admitted 
his guilt. If anything short of torture can shock your conscience, Alford pleas 
should. 
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Albert W. Alchuler, Straining at Gnats and Swallowing Camels: The Selective j\1orality of 
Professor Bibas, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1412 (July 2003). 
There is a clear difference between an Alford plea and a regular guilty plea and there is a 
clear difference between the thinking behind each. The fact that Mr. Steele wanted to take an 
Alford plea and get on with his life does not mean that his mindset was that he wanted to "plead 
guilty" so much so that even if he had to admit guilt he would do so. 
Mr. Steele testified that he would not have taken the Alford plea had the consequences 
been explained to him. He only took the plea because he believed that with the plea he could get 
probation and get on with his life. Had he known that his failure to admit factual guilt would 
render him ineligible for community based treatment and hence probation, he would not have 
taken the plea. This testimony, which was not impeached in any way by the state at the 
evidentiary hearing, is proof by a preponderance of the evidence of the prejudice prong of 
Strickland. Booth, supra. Had Mr. Steele been properly informed, he would not have taken the 
Alford plea. 
The state also makes the argument that Mr. Steele has not shown prejudice because, in 
the state's estimation, he would not have fared better ifhe had gone to trial. However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court just rejected this same analysis in Booth. 151 Idaho at 622, 262 P .3d at 265, fint. 
9, "Therefore, the fact that Booth may have benefitted by pleading guilty instead of going to trial 
is not relevant to whether he was prejudiced by Harris' deficient performance." 
Contrary to the state's arguments, Mr. Steele has demonstrated both deficient 
performance and prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence and therefore, on the basis of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as on the basis of due process violations, post-
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conviction relief should have been granted. 
III. CONCLUSION 
As set out in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Steele should have been granted post-
conviction relief. His plea was taken in violation of the state and federal constitutional rights to 
due process because it was entered without information about the consequences of the failure to 
admit factual guilt on the penalty he would receive and serve. And, his plea was taken in 
violation of the state and federal constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel because 
counsel was deficient in not properly advising Mr. Steele with regard to the consequences of 
Alford pleas and because, but for the deficiency, Mr. Steele would not have entered an Alford 
plea. 
r( 
Respectfully submitted this /V~day of May, 2012. 
~~¢{ 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorney for Earl Steele 
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